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Abstract 
Two experiments provide support for the hypothesis that, when people assess how much they 
trust another person, feelings of rightness from an initial, brief experience of regulatory fit 
(consistency between prevention or promotion regulatory focus of goals and strategic means) can 
suggest the other person is trustworthy, relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. 
This regulatory-fit effect on trust was stronger for acquaintances than for individuals participants 
knew well (Experiment 1) and was eliminated by drawing participants’ attention to how right the 
earlier, trust judgment-irrelevant event made them feel (Experiment 2). We discuss implications 
for regulatory fit theory, possible applications to applied settings and to other populations, and 
possible effects of other types of regulatory fit.  
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The Effect of Subjective Experiences of Regulatory Fit on Trust 
Trust appears to be essential for social relationships, and processes that can help or hinder 
the development of trust in very early stages of relationships are crucial to understand. This is 
because whether acquaintances develop into closer relationships could depend on small 
differences in initial guesses about how much to trust an acquaintance (see Weigel & Murray, 
2000). These guesses may result from social judgment processes of which the actors may not be 
introspectively aware (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Although theory and research in 
psychology have proposed and found numerous situational, dispositional, and dyadic factors that 
affect trust once people are already in a personal or professional relationship (for excellent 
reviews, see Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Simpson, 2007), relatively little research has focused on fundamental social judgment processes 
that could affect trust when people barely know the other person (though see Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005). However, understanding such processes could help enhance basic 
understanding of how relationships develop. One such process, which we studied in this initial 
research, is how very brief, initial feelings can serve as information for later judgments not 
pertaining to the feelings-eliciting event (e.g., Clore, 1992; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007). Similar to how nice weather can positively affect people’s 
satisfaction with their lives as a whole (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), an initial event that feels right 
might later affect how right people feel about trusting an acquaintance unrelated to that event. 
Because trust has been studied in various contexts in psychology (e.g., Holmes & 
Rempel, 1989; Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Simpson, 2007) as well as 
other disciplines including economics (Williamson, 1993) and sociology (Gambetta, 1998), 
many conceptual definitions of trust were available for us to use in our research. We chose to use 
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the same conceptual definition of trust as in previous research that, like ours, was designed to 
examine how very brief, initial feelings may influence later, unrelated judgments of trust 
regarding either acquaintances or people who participants know well (Dunn & Schweitzer, 
2005). Specifically, like Dunn and Schweitzer (2005, p. 736; also see Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998), we define trust as “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations about another’s behavior.” Because, like Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), we were 
interested in the kinds of judgments of trust that would be relevant to both acquaintanceships and 
closer relationships, we used their measure of interpersonal trust (also see Johnson-George and 
Swap, 1982), which contains items such as, “I would give            an important letter to mail 
after s/he mentions that s/he is stopping by the post office today” (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005, p. 
748). This item (and the others in the scale) is about willingness to accept vulnerability in a 
specific situation with a narrow time frame; this makes the scale useful for capturing trust in 
initial as well as close relationships.   
Even the sorts of very specific, trust-related judgments captured in Dunn and 
Schweitzer’s (2005) trust inventory could be complex to make, however; there is information 
about the imagined situations, the possible motives of each person, and other factors that people 
could potentially take into account. People considering someone they do not know well will not 
have much information they can draw upon for judgments about how much to trust the other 
person in a specific context. If they lack the ability or motivation to engage in a complex process 
of carefully weighing various pieces information about their acquaintance, they might simplify 
their judgment process by implicitly or explicitly asking themselves “How do I feel about 
trusting this person?” In other words, they might use a feelings-as-information heuristic (e.g., 
Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Clore, 1992; Higgins, 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2007). If 
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so, they could arrive at more positive assessments of trust the more right the idea of trusting the 
person seems to feel. In contrast, people considering close relationship partners or others they 
already know well are more likely to have previously-formed judgments about how much they 
can trust the other person in the specific circumstances in question. As a result, people judging 
the trustworthiness of others they know well should be less likely to use transient feelings as 
information (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; also see Forgas, 1995, 2001).  
Feelings can last longer than conscious thoughts that gave rise to them, which means that 
people can become confused about where their feelings came from (e.g., Clore, 1992). As a 
result, an initial event can elicit feelings that influence later judgments – even about topics not 
pertaining to the initial event. People tend to assume that feelings are caused by the information 
that happens to be in mind as long as the feelings seem relevant (Higgins, 1998; Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). This makes it possible for people to attribute feelings arising from an initial event 
to their judgments about a later topic that has nothing to do with the actual source of their 
feelings, as long as they implicitly ask “how do I feel about it?” and the feelings seem to have 
been caused by what they are judging (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007). Because use of 
feelings as information depends on implicit (mis)attributions about where the feelings came 
from, it should be possible to eliminate feelings-as-information effects by drawing attention to a 
judgment-incidental source of the feelings. Indeed, a classic way of showing that feelings elicited 
by an initial event affect later judgments about a completely different topic is to ask people how 
the initial event made them feel (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Doing so apparently clarifies that the 
later judgment topic is not what caused their initial feelings. This removes or even slightly 
reverses the effect of the feelings on later judgments, most likely through correction or 
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overcorrection for their otherwise biasing effect (e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006).  
Many affective and non-affective feelings can affect judgments (e.g., Clore, 1992; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Central to the current research is the experience of how well one’s 
imagined strategies of goal pursuit fit and sustain the self-regulatory orientation of a goal one has 
in mind; i.e., regulatory fit. Higgins (e.g., 2005, p. 209) has proposed that when there is 
regulatory fit, people “feel right” about what they are doing, and that this “feeling-right” 
experience can transfer over to subsequent, irrelevant judgments. This experience of regulatory 
fit is not strongly affective (Higgins, 2006); mood, for example, does not account for regulatory-
fit effects on judgments (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Cesario et al., 2004; Forster, 
Higgins & Idson, 1998; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden 2003; Hong & Lee, 2008; 
Shah, Higgins & Friedman, 1998; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, 
O’Rourke, et al., 2006). Rather, the feeling-right experience appears to be a motivational feeling 
that is associated with engagement strength (Higgins, 2005; 2006); indeed, it appears to enhance 
engagement with ideas that happen to be in mind at the time. Although the feeling-right 
experience can come from and affect judgments of the activities that caused it (a topic to which 
we return in the general discussion), we focused the current research on effects of judgment-
incidental experiences of regulatory fit/nonfit on trust. 
Initial events could produce feeling-right experiences that exert subtle influences on later 
trust of an acquaintance more often than people are aware.1 In part, this is because people often 
may lack the motivation or ability to engage in careful, systematic processing – deficits which 
should enhance the likelihood of unintentional use of feelings as information for later judgments 
(e.g., Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Forgas, 1995; 2001). Additionally, it seems likely that people 
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may not be aware enough of how the feeling-right experience relates to the fit between goal 
orientation and strategies of goal pursuit for them to notice and/or make accurate attributions 
about it. For example, if a teacher casually asks a student about a skill student should not let 
deteriorate over winter vacation, then asks for a few strategies the student could use to make sure 
everything goes right with that, the student probably can respond without much of a second 
thought. The student also probably is unaware of how the requested “eager” strategies do not fit 
the “prevention” orientation of the requested goal. If this is so, she will not be able to accurately 
label, make clear attributions about, or perhaps even consciously notice the vague sense of 
wrongness this conversation leaves her with. As a result, she can misattribute this feeling of 
wrongness to what she imagines about an acquaintance behaving in a trustworthy way when the 
acquaintance asks to copy her notes a few minutes later; because what she imagines seems to feel 
wrong, it reduces her likelihood of trusting the acquaintance. 
Interpersonal interactions such as this kind of student-teacher conversation may have 
inspired what has become the most common procedure for varying regulatory fit/nonfit 
separately from thoughts about the targets of judgment (e.g., Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; 
Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Hong & Lee, 2008; Vaughn, Hesse, Petkova, & Trudeau, in press; 
Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006). According to regulatory fit theory 
(e.g., Higgins, 2000; 2005), when people consider things they ideally would like to gain, they 
feel most right about eager strategies of goal pursuit – like making sure everything goes well – 
because these strategies fit and sustain these promotion-oriented goals best. When people 
consider things they believe they should not lose, they feel more right about vigilant strategies of 
goal pursuit – like avoiding anything that could go badly – because these strategies fit and 
sustain these prevention-oriented goals best. To vary feelings associated with regulatory fit that 
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could carry over to influence later judgments, researchers often ask participants to list two 
promotion-related goals (e.g., things participants ideally would like to gain or improve on) or 
prevention-related goals (e.g., things participants believe they should not lose or let deteriorate) 
and to provide either five eager strategies or five vigilant strategies for each (Cesario et al., 2004; 
Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Hong & Lee, 2008; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; 
Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006). Regulatory fit conditions pair promotion goals with eager 
strategies or prevention goals with vigilant strategies, and regulatory nonfit conditions pair 
prevention goals with eager strategies or promotion goals with vigilant strategies. This 
experimental procedure is very brief (on average, participants take about three minutes to do this 
task and tend to write about five words per goal or strategy). It also does not appear to create a 
noticeably strong state of promotion or prevention focus; no research using this kind of 
manipulation appears to have found main effects for promotion versus prevention focus (Hong & 
Lee, 2008; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006).  
This task nonetheless produces reliable regulatory-fit effects on subsequent judgments; in 
past research, these have included judgments related to the rightness or wrongness of one’s 
reactions to a later persuasive communication (Cesario et al., 2004), the rightness or wrongness 
of assumptions that one’s later judgments are unbiased (Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006), the 
rightness or wrongness of the imagined events in a later narrative (Vaughn et al., in press), and 
the rightness or wrongness of later decisions to stop or to continue working on a task (Vaughn, 
Malik, et al., 2006). Additionally, and consistent with use of feelings as information, asking how 
right an initial regulatory-fit task makes one feel is very effective at eliminating or even 
reversing regulatory-fit effects on later judgments (Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., in press; 
Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006), even though people appear not to 
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be practiced or noticeably good at carefully scaling and accurately reporting how right their own 
strategies for working toward a particular goal make them feel (cf. Cesario & Higgins, 2008). 
We used this procedure to examine whether judgment-incidental experiences of 
regulatory fit or nonfit could affect judgments of how much to trust another person, or how 
trustworthy the other person’s behavior might be. In the context of a questionnaire containing 
pages with different, mostly unrelated topics, participants first identified someone they knew and 
answered a few questions about their relationship with this person, knowing that they would later 
answer questions about him or her. On the next page they completed the regulatory fit 
manipulation, and on a subsequent page they answered questions about how much they would 
trust the earlier-identified person in various circumstances (the trust inventory from Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005). In Experiment 1, we examined whether, compared to regulatory nonfit, 
regulatory fit would exert a more positive influence on judgments of trust and to see whether this 
expected effect would be stronger for judgments of acquaintances than for judgments of 
individuals participants knew well. In Experiment 2, our goals were to replicate the expected 
effect on trust of acquaintances and to examine whether we could eliminate it by asking some 
participants how right they felt when doing the regulatory-fit task. Consistent with prior research 
using this kind of regulatory fit manipulation, we did not expect there to be a main effect of 
regulatory focus in either study. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred ten students participating in the study for extra credit in their psychology 
courses were randomly assigned to Regulatory Focus Goal (promotion vs. prevention) X 
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Regulatory Fit (fitting vs. nonfitting strategies) X Relationship (knows well vs. acquaintance) 
conditions. We excluded the data from twelve students who did not follow directions: four did 
not name a target person, three in the acquaintance condition named someone they knew well 
and/or to whom they were strongly romantically attracted (above the midpoint of the relevant 
scales described below, which were anchored at not at all… and extremely…), four in the knows 
well condition named someone they reported not knowing well (at or below the midpoint of the 
relevant scale), and one did not do the regulatory fit task. Additionally, to ensure maximum 
comparability between participants in the different target relationship conditions, we excluded 
the five participants in the knows well condition who reported high romantic interest in the 
person they identified (above the midpoint of the relevant scale).2 The final sample included 93 
participants (23 male, 2 who did not report a gender). There were no significant gender effects.  
Procedure 
We conducted sessions of 1-10 people in a computer lab, with at least one computer 
separating each person from the next. Participants learned that they would be doing a Web 
questionnaire containing pages with different, mostly unrelated topics; this questionnaire would 
take them about half an hour to do. We asked them to work through the pages of the 
questionnaire in order, and the completion times recorded for each page indicated that 
participants complied with these instructions. 
Identification and initial ratings of the target of judgment. On the first page of the Web 
questionnaire, we asked participants to bring to mind the name of an acquaintance or someone 
they knew well. In the acquaintance condition, we asked participants to “Think of a person who 
you have a class with, who you don't talk with much but whose name you know. This would be 
someone you feel pretty neutral about and in whom you don't have a romantic interest. Write 
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down this person's first name. Please do not write down this person’s last name.” In the knows 
well condition, we asked participants to “Think of a student [at this institution] who you know 
very well. This could be someone you feel positive or negative about. Write down this person's 
first name. Please do not write down this person’s last name.” After identifying this person, 
participants rated how well they knew him or her, how much they liked him or her, and how 
much romantic interest they had in him or her, using scales anchored at 1 (not at all) and 7 
(extremely well/very much/a great deal). At the bottom of this page, participants read that we 
would ask them more about this person later in the questionnaire.  
Manipulation of Judgment-Incidental Regulatory Fit and Regulatory Focus of Goals. On 
the next page of the Web questionnaire participants completed the regulatory focus and 
regulatory fit manipulations. We called this page of our questionnaire “What You Ideally Would 
Like to Gain or Improve on” (or “What You Believe You Should Not Lose or Let Deteriorate”). 
Participants read a brief introduction stating that on this page we were learning about “beliefs, 
skills, and/or extracurricular activities you ideally would like to gain or improve on [believe you 
should not lose or let deteriorate],” and they answered two questions about their year in college 
and their age. Then they completed a brief manipulation of regulatory focus and regulatory fit 
almost identical to that used in previous research (Cesario et al., 2004; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; 
Hong & Lee, 2008; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et 
al., 2006). Participants in the promotion goal conditions brought to mind two things they would 
ideally like to gain or improve on, while participants in the prevention goal conditions brought to 
mind two things they believed they should not lose or let deteriorate. We also asked participants 
to list five strategies for pursuing each goal. The promotion fit condition paired promotion goals 
with eager strategies (that “you could use to make sure everything goes right”), whereas the 
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prevention fit condition paired prevention goals with vigilant strategies (that “you could use to 
avoid anything that could go wrong”). The promotion nonfit condition paired promotion goals 
with vigilant strategies, whereas the prevention nonfit condition paired prevention goals with 
eager strategies.  
Filler task. Between the regulatory fit manipulation and the trust measure, participants 
did a short filler task titled “Consumer Preferences.” In this task they reported their favorite 
brand of toothpaste, shampoo, fast food, and soft drinks, and why they preferred it (price, quality 
or other). The purpose of this task was to reduce discounting of feelings of regulatory fit when 
making the trust judgments on the following page (e.g., Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006; Vaughn 
& Weary, 2003; also see Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993; McFarland, White, & Newth, 
2003). 
Trust inventory. On the next page, called “Person Perception,” participants read that we 
would like them to consider how they would feel about and behave toward the person they 
identified earlier in different, mundane situations. They also read that this was the last page on 
which we would ask them about this person. To ensure that they answered questions about the 
person they had identified earlier, we asked them to write this person’s first name again. Then 
they completed Dunn and Schweitzer’s (2005) trust inventory. This 10-item measure is based on 
Johnson-George and Swap’s (1982) Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale and assesses expectations 
of trustworthiness and intentions to trust the person they named. There are items, for example, 
about the perceived likelihood of this person meeting agreed-upon deadlines and of the 
respondent giving the person an important letter to mail after s/he mentions that s/he is stopping 
by the post office. Scale items are anchored by 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much), which are 
averaged after appropriate reverse-scoring (Cronbach’s alpha in this study was .91).  
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Afterward, participants completed materials for investigations unrelated to the current 
research. On the last page they provided demographic information. Finally, they were thanked 
and debriefed. 
Results 
Knowledge, liking, and romantic interest 
Participants reported knowing and liking people they knew well (knowing M = 5.93, SD 
= 0.88; liking M = 5.79, SD = 1.32) more than acquaintances (knowing M = 2.52, SD = 1.13; 
liking M = 4.28, SD = 1.20); knowing t(91) = 16.03, p < .001, d = 3.33; liking t(91) = 5.79, p < 
.001, d = 1.20. There was no significant difference between the knows well and acquaintance 
groups in their very low romantic interest in the target (knows well M = 1.19, SD = 0.82; 
acquaintance M = 1.14, SD = 0.53); t(91) = 0.32, p > .18, d = 0.07.  
Trust 
A Regulatory Focus of Goals X Regulatory Fit X Relationship ANOVA revealed a main 
effect for the type of relationship on trust, F(1, 85) = 25.47, p < .001, d = 1.04; unsurprisingly, 
participants reported trusting individuals they knew well (M = 5.61, SD = 1.18) more than 
acquaintances (M = 4.49, SD = 0.98). Additionally, it revealed the expected Regulatory Fit X 
Relationship interaction F(1, 85) = 4.02, p = .05 (see Figure 1). Planned contrasts explored this 
interaction. Among participants in the acquaintance conditions, those who earlier had 
experienced regulatory fit reported more trust (M = 4.83, SD = 0.94) than those who earlier had 
experienced regulatory nonfit (M = 4.15, SD = 0.91), t(48) = 2.58, p = .01, d = 0.73. Among 
participants in the knows well conditions, trust did not differ significantly between those who had 
experienced regulatory fit (M = 5.51, SD = 1.25) and those who had experienced regulatory 
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nonfit (M = 5.74, SD = 1.10), t(41) = -0.61, p = .55, d = .19. No other effects approached 
significance (all ps > .19). 
Discussion 
This experiment is the first to show that, compared to an experience of nonfit, an 
experience of regulatory fit in a brief, initial event can enhance later judgments of trust. 
Importantly, this effect was stronger for judgments of acquaintances than of people who 
participants knew well. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that, if people have fewer 
previously-formed judgments about the trustworthiness of an acquaintance than of someone they 
know well, they should tend to simplify what otherwise could be a complex judgment by 
implicitly or explicitly asking themselves how they feel about trusting their acquaintance.    
Experiment 2 
A time-honored way of demonstrating use of judgment-incidental feelings as information 
is to activate a subjective experience in an initial task, and then lead some participants to 
attribute their feelings to that (actual) source rather than to a subsequent, irrelevant judgment task 
(e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  If people use their judgment-incidental feelings as 
information because they are confused about the source of those feelings, then reducing source 
confusion should reduce the effect of the feelings on the later judgments. This is what we set out 
to do in Experiment 2. The procedure of this study was identical to Experiment 1, except that we 
asked all participants about an acquaintance and we drew some participants’ attention to how 
right the regulatory focus/fit task made them feel (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004). We expected 
participants who had experienced regulatory fit to report more trust of their acquaintance than 
those who had experienced regulatory nonfit, but only when we did not draw their attention to 
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the earlier task as a source of feelings of rightness. This pattern of results would be consistent 
with use of feelings of rightness/wrongness as information for judgments about trust.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-six undergraduate students participated in the study for extra credit in their 
psychology courses. They were randomly assigned to Regulatory Focus of Goals (prevention vs. 
promotion) X Regulatory Fit (fitting vs. nonfitting strategies) X Attention (attention drawn to 
how right the regulatory fit task felt vs. no attention) conditions. We excluded data from six 
people for not following instructions: five identified and answered questions about people who 
they knew well instead of acquaintances (above the midpoint of the relevant scale, which was 
anchored at not at all well and extremely well), and one did not do the filler task. This resulted in 
a final sample of 80 students (22 male). There were no significant gender effects. 
Procedure 
Students participated in sessions of 1-6 people in a computer lab, with at least one empty 
seat separating each student from the next. The procedure was almost identical to that in 
Experiment 1, except we asked all participants about an acquaintance and we varied whether we 
drew participants’ attention to how right the regulatory focus/fit task made them feel. In this 
study, Cronbach’s alpha for the trust inventory was .88.  
Attention manipulation. At the end of the Web page containing the regulatory fit 
manipulation, we directed some people’s attention to the regulatory fit task as a source of 
feelings of rightness by using instructions based on those developed by Cesario et al. (2004; also 
see Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006). The 
students randomly assigned to the attention condition read, “Thinking about using the right 
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strategies for pursuing a goal can make people ‘feel right’ about those strategies. Please indicate 
how much you ‘feel right’ about the strategies you came up with.” The scale ranged from 1 (not 
at all) to 7 (extremely). People in the no attention condition did not receive this question. 
Results 
Knowledge, liking, and romantic interest 
Overall, participants reported not knowing their acquaintance well (M = 2.29, SD = 0.86). 
Additionally, they reported liking their acquaintance moderately well (M = 4.04, SD = 1.18), and 
having very little romantic interest in their acquaintance (M = 1.26, SD = 0.71).  
Trust 
A Regulatory Focus of Goals X Regulatory Fit X Attention ANOVA revealed the 
predicted Regulatory Fit X Attention effect on trust, F(1, 72) = 5.91, p = .02 (see Figure 2). 
Planned contrasts explored this interaction. Among no attention participants (who did not receive 
the question about how right the regulatory focus/fit task made them feel), those who listed 
regulatory fitting strategies reported more trust (M = 4.86, SD = 1.09) than those who listed 
regulatory nonfitting ones (M = 4.10, SD = 1.14); t(37) = 2.12, p = .04, d = 0.68. Among 
attention participants, trust did not differ significantly between those who listed regulatory fitting 
goals (M = 4.25, SD = 0.93) and those who listed nonfitting goals (M = 4.45, SD = 1.11); t(39) = 
-0.62, p = .54, d = .19. 
Additionally, the ANOVA revealed an unexpected main effect for the regulatory focus of 
goals, F(1, 72) = 5.53, p = .02, d = 0.46. Participants who had listed two prevention goals 
reported trusting their acquaintance more (M = 4.63, SD = 1.04) than those who had listed two 
promotion goals (M = 4.13, SD = 1.09). This main effect was surprising because in previous 
research using this kind of procedure there have been no main effects for the regulatory focus of 
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requested goals (Hong & Lee, 2008; Vaughn et al., in press, Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; 
Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006). Additionally, the direction of this main effect is the opposite of 
what we would expect if participants in the prevention goal condition really became more 
prevention-focused overall (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006; Murray, Derrick, Leder, & 
Holmes, 2008). It seemed more likely that the participants randomly assigned to prevention 
conditions initially happened to have named acquaintances they liked somewhat better and 
trusted somewhat more. If so, controlling for how much participants initially reported liking their 
acquaintance should substantially weaken this main effect. To test this hypothesis, we carried out 
a Regulatory Focus of Goals X Regulatory Fit X Attention ANCOVA with liking of the 
acquaintance as the covariate. This analysis revealed a significant relationship with the covariate, 
F(1, 71) = 9.45, p = .003, and a significant Regulatory Fit X Attention interaction, F(1, 71) = 
4.36, p = .04, but no longer a significant main effect for the regulatory focus of goals, F(1, 71) = 
2.73, p > .10, d = 0.23. It appears, then, that this main effect may have been due to chance. 
Discussion 
As expected, when we did not draw participants’ attention to the judgment-incidental, 
regulatory-fit task as a source of feelings of rightness, participants who experienced regulatory fit 
reported trusting an earlier-identified acquaintance more than those who experienced regulatory 
nonfit. Additionally, drawing participants’ attention to the regulatory-fit task as a source of these 
feelings eliminated these effects, apparently through clarifying that something other than the 
acquaintance caused the feelings. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that, 
compared to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit, feelings of rightness from regulatory 
fit can enhance judgments of trust. 
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General Discussion 
When people do not yet know each other well, small contextual factors could have 
important effects on judgments of trust. These factors could include feelings resulting from a 
brief, initial event – even an event that has nothing to do with the person being judged. To 
simplify what otherwise could be a complex judgment about how much to trust someone they 
barely know, people may implicitly or explicitly ask themselves “How do I feel about trusting 
this person?” Feelings of rightness that seem relevant - and that do not appear to have been 
caused by something else - could inform these judgments (e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). Importantly, however, such incidental feelings should have a less powerful effect on 
judgments of trust regarding close relationship partners, about whom people are more likely to 
have relevant information they can bring to mind (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). 
Two experiments provided support for these hypotheses. Using an experimental 
procedure from prior research on regulatory fit (Cesario et al., 2004; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; 
Hong & Lee, 2008; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et 
al., 2006), we found that participants who experienced regulatory fit in an initial, brief event 
subsequently judged an acquaintance to be more trustworthy than did participants who initially 
experienced regulatory nonfit. As expected, this effect was stronger for judgments of 
acquaintances than of people the participants knew well. Additionally, and supporting the 
hypothesis that this is a feelings-as-information effect, we found that drawing participants’ 
attention to the regulatory-fit task as a source of feelings of rightness eliminated this effect on 
judgments of acquaintances (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., in press; Vaughn, Malik, et 
al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006).  Doing so apparently clarified that the acquaintance 
was not the source of such feelings, rendering the feelings irrelevant to the later judgments.  
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These findings extend implications of research on how other judgment-incidental 
experiences can affect interpersonal trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Although much research 
has addressed factors that affect trust in existing personal and professional relationships (e.g., 
Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Simpson, 2007), 
very little research has addressed how basic, social-judgment processes can affect trust – 
especially trust of people one barely knows. Dunn and Schweitzer’s (2005) research is an 
exception, and it was an inspiration for the current studies. It showed that judgment-incidental 
positive and negative emotions can affect later judgments of trust – particularly trust of an 
acquaintance – as long as people do not attribute the feelings to something other than the 
acquaintance. It also found that this effect differs very much according to secondary appraisals of 
internal or external causation associated with various emotions. For example, although guilt and 
anger are both negative emotions, the anger-related secondary appraisal of other-person 
causation appears to let anger be used as information for judgments of trust; the guilt-related 
secondary appraisal of self-causation appears not to allow guilt to affect trust. Our research 
extends these findings by showing that effects of judgment-incidental experiences on trust are 
not limited to particular emotions, or even to subjective experiences with a strong affective 
component. 
Additionally, our findings contribute to basic research on regulatory fit by providing 
support to the proposal that regulatory fit enhances engagement with ideas that happen to be in 
mind at the time (e.g., Higgins, 2005, 2006); in this case, the idea of trusting the acquaintance 
(provided by the trust inventory items). Furthermore, the current research suggests that this effect 
occurs through a feelings-as-information process (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., in 
press; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006). This research also adds an 
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important boundary condition to incidental regulatory-fit effects (i.e., effects of regulatory-fit 
experiences not resulting from the topic of judgment): people’s relationship to or familiarity with 
the target of judgment. In general, the more knowledge people have about a target of judgment 
and/or the more motivated they are to arrive at particular judgments about the target, the less 
likely effects of incidental regulatory fit may be (for relevant research on other feelings, see 
Forgas, 1995, 2001; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002). Future research should examine this hypothesis 
regarding judgments and targets other than the ones we examined here. 
Our experimental manipulations of regulatory fit were brief, as was the likely duration of 
their effects on subsequent judgments. A limitation of the current research is that it did not 
address possible cumulative effects of incidental regulatory fit on judgments of trust. Future 
researchers may be able to examine such effects in real-world contexts. For example, educational 
psychologists interested in helping teachers to foster trust among incoming students may suggest 
interventions that apply an understanding of regulatory fit to how teachers design and describe 
assignments. Beyond the likely positive effects of regulatory fit on students’ engagement with 
the assignments themselves (e.g., Forster et al., 1998; Freitas et al., 2002; Shah et al., 1998; 
Spiegel et al., 2004), lingering feelings from experiences of regulatory fit in a classroom could 
exert cumulative effects on judgments of trust between students – as long as teachers do not 
point out to students that this could be happening. As another example, consider people who 
have sought out a support group because they are looking for a new social network to provide 
support around a certain issue: they need to make quick judgments about whether or not to trust 
these new acquaintances enough to become closer and disclose personal information. If the 
support group facilitator asked participants to list their goals for the group (e.g., “I want to talk 
about creating healthy relationships”) and asked about strategies they plan to use within the 
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group to attain these goals, it seems that it would be fairly easy to frame this exercise in a 
regulatory-fitting manner (i.e., ask what they would like to gain from participating in the group, 
and how they would ensure that this goes well). Doing so could create a lingering feeling-right 
experience that could transfer to the idea of opening up to their fellow group members. Given the 
many contexts in which snap judgments of new people could be a qualifying factor in decisions 
about whether to become closer, possible real-world applications of the current research are quite 
varied. We look forward to future research that explores such applications. 
Another important limitation of the current research is that its applications to other 
settings and populations remain to be examined. Our participants were predominantly White, 
middle-class college students at a regional university/comprehensive college in the northeastern 
United States, over half of whom were first-year students. It is not clear how well our findings 
would generalize to a more ethnically or economically diverse sample, to people in another 
geographic region, or to people who are not currently students. We believe that our current 
results may apply most broadly in populations where many people are developing new social 
networks, as most of the students in our study were. For example, it is normal for people in the 
military – where trust is essential - to need to develop new social networks when they are 
assigned a permanent change of station, which typically happens about once every three years. 
Could training commanders to frame activities in regulatory-fitting rather than nonfitting ways 
have important incidental effects on interpersonal trust, especially if cumulated over time and 
considering the large number of people serving in the military? A related demographic limitation 
of our study is that all of our students were enrolled in psychology courses; many were 
psychology majors. We wonder whether results would be stronger or weaker among people who 
might not be as psychologically minded; psychology majors might be relatively attuned to their 
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feelings and likely to use them as information for judgments, but also might be more likely to 
correct or overcorrect for the effects of feelings they no longer consider relevant to a judgment.  
A third limitation is that we examined only the effects of a judgment-incidental source of 
regulatory fit on interpersonal trust. An important question remaining from this research is 
whether regulatory fit could, under various circumstances, affect judgments of how much to trust 
a close relationship partner. We believe it could if the experiences of regulatory fit result from 
events occurring within a relationship. In this case, the regulatory fit experience, being integral to 
the functioning of the relationship itself, may reflect fairly stable ongoing patterns of fit or nonfit 
between partners who know each other well. (For example, if roommates have different self-
regulatory strategies for pursuing the same goal – e.g., for keeping up a shared living space – 
they might tend to perceive each others’ strategies as wrong; they also may be able to recall 
specific times when behaviors associated with their roommate’s nonfitting regulatory focus 
seemed to impede their progress toward their own goals.) If so, it would be the content of the 
relationship that is fitting or not fitting, which could affect judgments through consideration of 
this content rather than through a feelings-as-information process. Even if feelings of rightness or 
wrongness are strongly involved in such regulatory fit/nonfit effects, these effects may not be 
strongly influenced by (mis)attribution manipulations – in fact, drawing attention to the source of 
these feelings (the relationship dynamics) may enhance rather than diminish the impact of 
relationship-integral regulatory fit on trust of the partner. These considerations were beyond the 
scope of the current research, but we look forward to forthcoming work by other laboratories that 
addresses these and related issues (e.g., Rusbult & Righetti, 2008). 
A final limitation is that we only examined one kind of regulatory fit, namely the fit 
between the prevention or promotion focus of goals and the vigilance or eagerness of strategies 
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for pursuing the goals. Regulatory fit can happen in other ways as well. For example, it can occur 
between individuals’ chronic tendency toward promotion or prevention and the strategies 
afforded in a given situation; it also can occur between the strategic orientations of certain 
personality traits and the regulatory focus of goals (e.g., Vaughn, Baumann, & Klemann, 2008). 
Additionally, fit effects can occur with other motivational orientations, such as tendencies to 
move from state to state versus to make comparisons (Avnet & Higgins, 2003), or orientations 
associated with perceiving that a task is meant to be important versus that is meant to be fun 
(Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003).  Various kinds of fit experiences could influence interpersonal 
trust differently, and may do so in different ways depending on whether the experience is 
incidental or integral to the relationship in question. 
In conclusion, the current research contributes to research literatures on trust, regulatory 
fit, and use of feelings as information through integrating and extending implications of each 
body of research to the others. We found that, especially when people do not yet know each 
other well, even a brief, initial experience of regulatory fit or nonfit can enhance or diminish 
subsequent judgments of trust as long as people can (implicitly) attribute feelings from that 
experience to thoughts about trusting the other person. The duration of this manipulation was 
short and the likely duration of its effects was also short. However, incidental regulatory-fit 
effects on judgments of trust could have cumulative effects on trust and relationship 
development. We look forward to future research that explores these and other possibilities.  
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Footnotes 
1 Exactly how often this process affects judgments of trust in everyday life is a question 
the current research was not designed to resolve. Indeed, we doubt that a diary study - if 
attempted - would provide much reliable information about the processes by which feelings may 
affect judgments of trust. Although people appear to be very good at reporting the products of 
their mental information-processing systems, they appear not to have much introspective access 
to the ways in which they actually arrive at their judgments (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Future researchers who wish to document the exact frequency of this – or any other –social 
judgment process in everyday life would do well to bear in mind research suggesting the 
likelihood of actually being able to accomplish this goal (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
2 Results were almost identical when we included the five participants in the knows well 
condition who reported strong romantic interest in the person they named. For example, there 
were no significant gender effects. Additionally, although the knows well and acquaintance 
groups differed significantly in reported romantic interest in the target (M = 1.73, SD = 1.81, 
versus M = 1.14, SD = 0.53; with equal variances not assumed, t(54.87) = -2.17, p = .03, d = 
0.45), there were almost identical differences in knowledge of the target (t(96) = -17.02, p < 
.001, d = 3.44) and liking of the target (t(96) = -6.49, p < .001, d = 1.31). Moreover, a Regulatory 
Focus of Goals X Regulatory Fit X Relationship ANOVA with trust as the dependent variable 
revealed the same relationship main effect, F(1, 90) = 33.14, p < .001, d = 1.14; and the same 
interaction effect F(1, 90) = 6.16, p = .02; no other effects were significant, ps > .18. Among 
participants in the acquaintance conditions, those who experienced regulatory fit reported more 
trust (M = 4.83, SD = 0.94) than those who experienced regulatory nonfit (M = 4.15, SD = 0.91); 
t(48) = -2.58, p = .01, d = 0.73. Among participants in the knows well conditions, the regulatory 
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fit effect was much weaker; trust did not differ significantly between those who experienced 
regulatory fit (M = 5.53, SD = 1.23) and those who experienced regulatory nonfit (M = 5.93, SD 
= 1.08); t(46) = 1.18, p = .24, d = 0.34.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Trust as a function of regulatory fit condition and relationship with the trustee, 
Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. Trust as a function of regulatory fit condition and attention condition, Experiment 2. 
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